The SC on Delay

Hole of Justice

By Peter G. Jimenea
 

The Supreme Court on Delay

“Injustice lies fairly in delayed decision than an erroneous one which can be appealed immediately. Delay causes prolonged anxiety to party litigants and could tie their assets and other properties in litigation.”

This explains why the Bill of Rights contains as it is in Art. III of the Constitution occupies a position of primacy to the fundamental law way above the articles on government powers. This includes the right of the accused for a speedy trial of his case. Jurisprudence dictates, lex reprobate moram – the law disapproves of delay.

The Court values liberty and will insist on the observance of basic Constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the extremely abusive investigative and prosecutor powers of the government. Summum jus, summum injuria – extreme enforcement of law may lead to injustice. (Berico vs CA, 225 SCRA 562).

Let’s take the case of Rafael Coscolluela, governor of Negros Occidental for three full terms from July 1992 to June 30, 2001. During his tenure of office, Edwin Nacionales served as his Special Projects Head, Jose Ma. Amugod as assistant and Ernesto Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.

On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman Visayas received a letter-complaint dated November 7, 2001 from the People’s Graftwatch, requesting to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.

Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation. A Final Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002, upgrading the complaint into a criminal case was filed. The respondents also filed their respective counter-affidavits.

On March 27, 2003, Graft- Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” and recommended the filing of corresponding information.

He submits the same to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro for recommendation. Miro recommended approval of the Information on June 5, 2003.  Acting Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro approved it on May 21, 2009 and filed it at the Sandiganbayan on June 19, 2009. (Take note of the time lapsed)

On July 9, 2009, a Motion To Quash was filed with the Sandiganbayan Second Division by Coscolluela arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. He learned of the Resolution and Information only on March 27, 2003, when they get a copy after its filing with the Sandiganbayan.

He cited that the criminal charges against him were resolved only after eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted,when the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution. His co-respondents Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted his motion.

An opposition to Motion to Quash filed by the Ombudsman on August 7, 2009, cited the Information originally dated March 27, 2003, has still to go through careful reviews and revisions before its final approval. And respondents never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim.

The SANDIGANBAYAN SECOND DIVISION, however, recognizes the prejudice caused to petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them. It said that it was the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.

In the case of Barker vs. Wingo, the Court said that a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. So, it ordered the Sandiganbayan First Division to DISMISS the case against all the respondents. (G.R. No. 191411).

One Final Note: The SC finds the inordinate delay of more than six (6) years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against Petitioner to be violative of his Constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy disposition of the case against him. (Anchangco v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301)